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Abstract
The social science literature on xenophobia is immense. Researchers have found that individual levels of
xenophobia have a strong correlation with economic indicators, education, and political affiliation.
However, do they have any correlation with unconventional indicators like happiness? This paper uses
data from the World Value Survey to study the correlation between individual happiness and xenophobia. I
find that there is a significant correlation between individual levels of happiness and xenophobia, even
when controlling for income around the world.
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Part One: Research Proposal
Introduction
Immigration is one of the most contentious issues in world politics. To the native citizen,
it is a hot button issue where they feel threatened by the potential economic and cultural effects
of a laxed immigration policy. To the immigrant, its significant stakes mean that having a laxed
or tight immigration policy can mean the difference between life and death.
As the Syrian Refugee crisis shows, countries always seem to grapple with the issue of
immigration in their respective politics. Beginning in 2011, the Syrian refugee crisis has forced
6.6 million refugees to escape Syria and find a new home in the surrounding Middle Eastern and
European countries (“The Syrian Refugee Crisis Explained”). The response by these countries
were mixed depending on the country in question. Middle Eastern countries such as Turkey,
Lebanon, and Jordan had accepted millions of refugees, while Israel had accepted none citing the
possible threat of terrorism. European countries such as France, Sweden, Germany, and Greece
had also accepted several hundred thousand refugees (Stone 2016), but they later received
cultural backlash from some of their constituents, which led to the rise of anti-immigrant, rightwing parties.
As the stakes involved in the immigration debates show, the public’s xenophobia
influences how governments structure their immigration policies. The rise of right-wing parties
in Europe is just another example of this phenomenon. Therefore, it is vitally important to at
least attempt to answer the question: under what conditions do individuals exhibit the
characteristics of xenophobia?

Some politicians already seem to know the variables which influence xenophobia among
their constituents. President Trump of the United States has repeatedly cited economic concerns
such as job scarcity as a proxy to implement tighter immigration policies, while Israel Prime
Minister Netanyahu has cited the possibility of terrorism to deny taking in Syrian refugees (Stone
2016). Understanding the variables which influence an individual’s level of xenophobia will
allow us to understand whether these typical arguments for tighter immigration policies have any
correlation with xenophobia, and whether additional variables exist.
This research will begin by navigating the immense political science literature on
xenophobia. There will be a deep analysis on the multiple variables which are concluded to
correlate with xenophobia. These include economic indicators such as perceptions on job
scarcity and the perception on the usage of welfare programs by immigrants (Hainmueller and
Hiscox 2010).
Among these economic variables, it must be emphasized that we are observing whether
individuals perceive these variables to be affecting another variable and not the reality of their
relationship (Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2013). For example, there is an intense disagreement
among economists on whether low skilled immigrants drive down wages for native low skilled
workers. However, that is not our focus. The focus is on whether respondents perceive
immigrants to be driving down wages for other low skilled workers. We than want to compare
these variables with an individual’s level of xenophobia (Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2013).
We would also look at non-economic variables such as education and party preference.

The research will then zero-in on a few variables that have been rarely reviewed in the
political-science literature. Then, a hypothesis with a plausible explanation will be formed
between the mystery variable and the xenophobia variable.
In the second stage, a research plan will be formed to test the hypothesis. Statistics from
the World Value Survey would be used to get a general understanding of the relationship. In the
final stage, the results will be used to conclude whether this mystery variable has any form of
correlation with the xenophobia variable.
The Literature Review
Much of the political science literature on immigration and xenophobia is fixated on its
relationship with an individual’s economic concerns, so it would be fitting to start there. Many
researchers hypothesize that native citizens blame immigrants for their economic stress due to
two variables: whether native citizens feel they are competing for jobs with immigrants and
whether native citizens feel they are competing for access to government welfare with
immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). The fear of labor market competition has been used
to create a prominent model called the labor market competition model. This model predicts that
native citizens will be most opposed to immigrants in their own skill level because they fear
being competed out of their jobs. The fiscal burden model has been used to predict that highincome natives would oppose the immigration of low-income individuals more than high-income
individuals, due to the fiscal burden it places on their respective governments. Researchers
believe this difference will be more pronounced in states with comparatively generous welfare
programs (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010).

Several studies which have implemented the labor market competition model have found
a correlation (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Dustmann and Preston 2006; Fetzer
2000; Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002; Harwood 1986). Two studies have found a strong
correlation. The study by Scheve and Slaughter in 2001 found a strong positive correlation
between the respondent’s years of education and their support for immigration using the National
Election Survey data. Mayda in 2006 conducted a similar study using the National Identity
Module of the International Social Survey Programme by the World Value Survey.
Two studies which have implemented the fiscal burden model have also found a
correlation. A study by Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter in 2007 used the National Election Survey
data to compare attitudes towards immigration in different states in the United States. They
found that individuals with higher incomes were less willing to support immigration if they lived
in states with generous welfare benefits. Another study by Facchini and Mayda in 2009 used data
from the International Social Survey Programme. They found that a respondents’ income has a
negative correlation with support for immigration in countries where a large portion of their
immigrants were made up of high-skilled workers.
These studies are intriguing, but they are insufficient in their methods to be cited as
definitive conclusions. For one thing, the two models used to construct these studies: the labor
market competition model and the fiscal burden model make several assumptions. In the labor
market competition model, it assumes that native citizens are knowledgeable enough to
recognize that immigrants in their own skill level may outcompete with them on jobs. On the
fiscal burden model, it assumes that high income individuals are knowledgeable enough to
recognize that immigrants may take advantage of the welfare in their state. Putting aside the
truthfulness of these statements, these models are built on these assumptions, and it is unclear

whether respondents take these ideas into account when they comprehend their approval of
immigrants. Hainmueller and Hiscox in their 2010 study also argue that there may be alternative
variables to explain these correlations. For example, the strong correlation between an
individual’s income and their support for immigration may not be the result of the fear
concerning labor market competition, but by non-economic variables such as education, racial
prejudice, and party preference. In other words, the validity of the labor competition model and
the fiscal burden model is somewhat questionable.
Education is one non-economic variable that has been compared with attitudes towards
immigration by many researchers. Most researchers have found a positive correlation between
years of education and pro-immigrant attitudes. Many have used this positive correlation to
theorize that higher levels of education lead to racial tolerance, preference for cultural diversity,
and a higher understanding of economics (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Citrin et al. 1997; Dustmann
and Preston 2007; Fetzer 2000; Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002; Hainmueller and Hiscox
2007). Some papers have focused on countries which have implemented new educational
programs to observe their effects on an individual’s level of xenophobia. In one example, a paper
by Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun in 2013 used data from the Eurobarometer to find that:
“increased schooling between 1988 and 2003 [was] associated with a decline in anti-foreign
attitudes by 3.4 percent.”
The political science literature on education versus xenophobia shows a strong reliable
correlation with a high validity method used to measure the extent to which education affects
xenophobia. Unlike the economic variables discussed previously, which was based on a
hypothetical fiscal burden and labor competition model, it is easier to create a model to measure

how education affects xenophobia. This is because an individual’s level of education is a very
valid measure, which can be represented by their years of education.
The theories formed by researchers to explain this positive correlation are relatively
convincing. The theory that higher levels of education lead individuals to have racial, ethnic
tolerance, preference for cultural diversity, and a higher understanding of economics (Chandler
and Tsai 2001; Citrin et al. 1997; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Fetzer 2000; Gang, Rivera-Batiz,
and Yun 2002; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007) is very conventional and is easy for readers to
imagine. Education allows individuals to have contact with different kinds of people and ideas
which may change their perspective on immigration. This theory is related to another theory in
political science called contact theory. Contact theory is the idea that increasing interaction
between native citizens and immigrants lead to increasing tolerance of immigrants by native
citizens (Bose 2020). A 2018 paper by Young, Loebach, and Korienk found that a one percent
increase in the immigrant population decreased support for stricter immigration laws by fifteen
percent and decreased support for entirely prohibitive immigration laws by twenty-five percent.
This specific body of research gives credibility to contact theory, but it also gives weight to the
theory used to explain the correlation between years of education and attitudes towards
immigrants. Of course, being in contact with another immigrant is not the same as being exposed
to different kinds of viewpoints in education, but it represents the same idea. In both cases,
individuals are being exposed to different kinds of people and ideas, which may have the same
effect on individuals. Therefore, because of these variables, individuals may become more
tolerant towards immigration.
The final variables that will be discussed here is ideology and party affiliation. The vast
literature which discusses the relationship of ideology with attitudes towards immigration tend to

focus on two aspects: whether conservative parties in power practice more restrictive
immigration policies than others and whether individuals who identify themselves as a
conservative tend to be less tolerant of immigrants than liberal individuals.
Concerning parties in power, much of the literature suggests a correlation between the
ruling party’s ideology and their immigration policies (Fitzgerald, Leblang and Teets 2014;
Anderson 1996; Arzheimer 2009). As an example, a 2018 paper by Marcelo de Almeida
Medeiros, Dalson Britto Figueiredo Filho etcetera, who did a comparative study of European
states, show a link between party ideology and their immigration policies. One of their models
showed that, “a one-point increase in ideology is associated with a thirteen percent average
reduction in the number of refugees entering the country.”
The literature also seems to show that individuals who are conservative tend to support
more restrictive immigration policies than individuals who are liberal. Studies have focused on
specific states to see whether individual party affiliation correlates with attitudes towards
immigration. A study by Peter Hays Gries from 2016 asked liberal and conservative Americans
whether they supported tougher border policies out of a scale of seven. The results showed that,
on average, conservatives agreed that the United States needed to implement tougher Mexican
border policies by 6.6 out of 7 points. On average, liberals called for tougher Mexican border
policies by 4.2 out of 7 points. A 2017 study by Harteveld, Kokkonen and Dahlberg looked at the
individual effects of party affiliation on immigrant attitudes from Netherlands and Sweden. Their
results showed a correlation between party affiliation and immigrant attitudes. It also showed
that voters would adjust their views in line with the party they identify with, including attitudes
towards immigrants. This shift was especially prevalent in far-right parties.

The relationship between individual ideology and xenophobia is intriguing, but it should
be perceived with caution. Specifically for party affiliation, every conservative party has a
different ideology depending on the state, which makes it difficult to draw a pattern. The
Republican party in the United States is not the same as the Center-Right party in Germany, and
we should not attempt to draw broad conclusions that individuals in any conservative party
would tend to have anti-immigrant views. However, this conclusion becomes more appropriate
when we focus on specific states, thus making this relationship stronger.
Ultimately, the vast literature on individual levels of xenophobia boil down to its
relationship with three variables: economic indicators, education, and party affiliation. The
literature concerning economic indicators is numerous and they all show a strong positive
correlation between the variables. However, occasionally, the methods used to measure these
relationships have questionable validity, which must be further investigated. The literature which
focuses on education is more reliable and shows a strong positive correlation between years of
education and tolerance towards immigrants. Most of the literature concerning education also has
a strong conventional theory to explain this relationship. Finally, ideology and party affiliation
also seem to have a correlation with xenophobia, but the degree of the relationship differs
depending on the state in question.
Causal Argument
After an extensive review of the political science literature on xenophobia, there were
several variables that were found to be rarely discussed. Two of these variables were wellbeing
and happiness.

Happiness is a very subjective variable, making it a difficult variable to nail with a
general conceptual and operational definition. The founder of the World Value Survey, Ronald
Inglehart, has conducted numerous studies on national and individual levels of happiness. A
famous paper by Inglehart, Roberto Foa, Christopher Peterson, and Christian Welzel from 2008
has explained that national levels of happiness has risen since 1981 due to economic
development and democratization around the world. Inglehart, in a study encompassing 24
countries, has also demonstrated that a country’s Gross National Product has a 0.67 correlation
with life-satisfaction (Inglehart 1999).
From these studies, we define the conceptual definition of happiness as encompassing
two parts: whether an individual has their human needs adequately fulfilled (material needs,
health needs, social needs etc.) and how an individual perceives their quality of life. I emphasize
perceive so this definition can encompass the subjective nature of happiness. As an example,
there are wealthy individuals who have their needs adequately fulfilled yet perceive their quality
of life to be poor. Therefore, this two-part definition becomes necessary.
I argue that individual levels of happiness would correlate with xenophobia. Individuals
who are happy would feel that their lives are fulfilling and would likely have little to no social
and economic anxiety. Therefore, they would have nothing to fear, and thus would have little to
no fear of immigrants, especially compared to those who are unhappy.
Hypothesis: In a comparison of individuals, those who are happy will be more likely to
be less xenophobic than those who are unhappy.
Another thing to consider in this experiment are variables that may influence happiness
and wellbeing. Conventionally, most people would argue that people who are rich and receive

higher incomes tend to be happier than those who are poor and receive low incomes. Putting
aside the truthfulness of this statement, it is a plausible antecedent independent variable.
Therefore, in this study, we would also focus on controlling for income.

Part II: Research Design Section
Introduction
In order to test the hypotheses, the experiment was conducted using data from the World
Value Survey Wave seven. The World Value Survey is conducted every five years with this
specific questionnaire taking place from 2011 to 2014. These surveys are based on responses
from 1200 individuals which are represented as a national body. Countries with populations
below two million were based on 1,000 individuals and countries with high populations were
based on 1500 respondents. The World Value Survey is conducted in 120 countries representing
94.5 percent of the world population (Inglehart 2014).
For this experiment, the World Value Survey was chosen for two main reasons. First, any
kind of question concerning happiness and xenophobia is not bound to any culture and is
universal in scale. Therefore, the World Value Survey’s macro level analysis allows us to find
the correlation between these variables without being bound to a certain country. Second, unlike
most datasets, the World Value Survey has a happiness variable which allows us to measure how
individuals around the world would rate their happiness.
Variable Measurements
In order to operationalize this definition of happiness, I used the Q46 variable from the
World Value Survey. Q46 is an ordinal level variable which asks an individual’s “Feeling of
Happiness” from a one to four scale. This scale is made up of “1. Very happy,” “2. Quite happy,”
“3. Not very happy,” and “4. Not at all happy.” The mode was used as the descriptive statistic of
this variable.

Xenophobia is defined in the Merriam-Webster dictionary as “fear and hatred of strangers
or foreigners or of anything that is strange or foreign” (“Xenophobia”). In the World Value
Survey, likely because xenophobia is taboo to be publicly expressed, it is not a variable that is
directly operationalized by asking individuals their levels of xenophobia. However, the World
Value Survey does have variable Q34 which asks individuals to respond to the statement,
“Employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants.” This question creates an
operational definition of xenophobia, where it can be measured without being directly asked. In
this hypothetical scenario described by Q34, the only difference between these potential workers
is whether they are native workers or foreign workers. Therefore, we can assume that the
respondents who agree or strongly agree with this statement have higher levels of xenophobia
than other respondents. Q34 is an ordinal level variable with a five-point scale. This scale is
made up of “1. Agree strongly,” “2. Agree,” “3. Neither agree nor disagree,” “4. Disagree,” and
“5. Disagree strongly.” The mode and the mean were used as the descriptive statistic for this
variable.
The literature has indicated that there is a strong correlation between income and
xenophobia. Therefore, this experiment will control for income in the regression analysis.
Q288R is a recoded ordinal level variable with a three-point scale. The variable measures
individual income levels. This scale is made up of “Low,” “Middle,” and “High.” The mode was
the used as the descriptive statistic for this variable.
The means of the xenophobia variables are shown in table 1, which compares xenophobia
with happiness and income. Figure 1 graphs this relationship in a box plot using mode. The
spread of the data is depicted.

Table 1: Happiness and Income Versus Xenophobia by Mean
Income level
Feeling of
happiness

Low

Medium

High

Total

Very happy

2.20

2.24

2.55

2.30

Quite happy

2.15

2.19

2.34

2.21

Not very happy

1.98

2.05

2.19

2.03

Not at all

1.86

1.95

2.15

1.92

Total

2.12

2.18

2.43

2.21

Model Estimation
In this experiment, I used logistic regression to model the correlation between the
variables. I treated Q 34, the variable for xenophobia, as an interval level variable which is why
logistic regression was chosen over the other models of experimentation.
Results
Table 2: Coefficients and other Descriptive Values
Variables

Q34
(Xenophobia)
Q46 (Happiness)
-0.0477***
(0.0144)
Q288R (Income)
0.187***
(0.0148)
Happiness-income
-0.0330***
(0.00751)
Constant
2.061***
(0.0296)
Observations
114,096
R-squared
0.010
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Point Estimates of Xenophobia with Upper and Lower Bounds
Happy and high
income

Unhappy and
high income

Happy and low
income

Unhappy and
low income

Upper Bound

2.49

2.08

2.19

1.96

Point Estimates

2.47

2.03

2.17

1.93

Lower Bound

2.45

1.99

2.15

1.89

The values, expressed in table 2, show that the p-values for the variables are below 0.05
and the standard error is below five percent. The confidence intervals, expressed in table 3, show
a significant difference between the lower bound and the upper bound of the y-values. Therefore,
we can reject the null hypothesis for this relationship. In this logistic regression, the difference
between the x-values were displayed by two extremes: low income versus high income and
happy versus unhappy. Therefore, it would be difficult to interpret the coefficients of these
values. Instead, I displayed the values as bar graphs on figure 2 to interpret their relationship.
In political science, the conventional view is that income has a negative relationship with
xenophobia: Figure 2 supports this conclusion. When comparing unhappy low income and
unhappy high-income individuals, unhappy high-income individuals are less xenophobic than

unhappy low-income individuals. In vice-versa, when comparing the xenophobia between happy
low-income individuals and happy high-income individuals, happy high-income individuals are
less xenophobic than happy low-income individuals.
In this experiment, we find a significant relationship between happiness and xenophobia
even when income is held constant. In other words, as happiness levels decrease individuals
become more xenophobic. When we compare low-income happy individuals versus low-income
unhappy individuals, low-income happy individuals are less xenophobic. On the other hand,
when we compare high income happy individuals and high-income unhappy individuals, highincome happy individuals are less xenophobic.
Discussion and Conclusion
The data shows a significant correlation between individual levels of happiness and
individual levels of xenophobia. This is especially significant since individual income was held
constant in this experiment. Therefore, we can reject the claim that correlation between
happiness and xenophobia was only visible due to income being an antecedent variable. The
model shows that the three variables have an additive relationship.
The results support the theory that individuals who are happy would likely have little to
no social, economic, and cultural anxiety. Therefore, they would have nothing to fear, and thus
would have little to no fear of immigrants compared to those who are unhappy. Unhappy
individuals may also be more likely to scapegoat their problems onto immigrants, making them
more xenophobic than happy individuals.
As mentioned above, most of the political science literature encompassing xenophobia
focuses on its relationship to economic indicators, education, and ideology. In contrast,

xenophobia’s relationship with happiness is a largely unexplored concept. The findings of this
experiment only highlight the further research that should be made into this relationship. Future
experiments should control for other variables such as education and ideology to see if this
relationship between happiness and xenophobia still holds. Another experiment should use a
different operational definition to measure xenophobia, possibly by measuring individual support
for a country having laxed immigration policies. Xenophobic levels may also differ depending
on who is seen as the outsider: questions concerning Syrian refugees may cause higher
xenophobic levels than questions concerning Latin-American migrants.
Studies on happiness largely focus on its correlation with freedom, social tolerance, and
economic indicators. The literature seems to indicate that happiness is commonly studied as a
dependent variable instead of an independent variable (Inglehart 2008; Welsh 2003; Schyns
1998; Ott 2001; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Our study largely diverged from the literature in that
we treated happiness as an independent variable. The literature’s focus on treating happiness as a
dependent variable is understandable, since researchers have always been debating the factors
which influence individual levels of happiness. However, it is also important to understand the
variables which are affected by individual happiness.
Our research has shown that xenophobia is a variable which correlates with individual
happiness. A skeptic may argue that since the literature shows how freedom and economic
development have a positive correlation with happiness, freedom and economic development are
the real antecedent variable which influence individual levels of xenophobia. Although our study
focused on individual level variables which influence xenophobia, this skeptical view presents a
plausible hypothesis. Further studies could be made by replicating our experiment but keep
macro level variables such as economic development and freedom constant. One thing to take

from this experiment is the need for governments to provide their citizens with the opportunities
to seek happiness. This can provide a remedy against conflict driven feelings such as
xenophobia.
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